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The problem
International environmental agreements (IEAs) are essential for the stabilization of the world climate at safe levels through the effective reduction of global carbon emissions. The first legally binding international agreement on climate protection, the Kyoto Protocol, has been criticized because it includes commitments for a small number of countries only and is therefore likely to accomplish very little in terms of global emission reduction (Buchner et al. 2002) . The prospects are bleak for reaching an IEA in the near future which accomplishes both attracting many signatories and reducing global emissions significantly. The tedious practical negotiations and the serious global change challenge call for continued investigations of the theoretical foundations of successful and effective IEAs.
Since the early 1990s an economic literature has developed on self-enforcing IEAs. An IEA is said to be self-enforcing or stable if no signatory country has an incentive to leave the IEA and no non-signatory country has an incentive to join. The seminal papers on selfenforcing IEAs include Barrett (1992 Barrett ( , 1994 , Hoel (1992) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) .
Most papers are quite pessimistic about the stability of large IEAs. Carraro and Siniscalco (1991) , Hoel (1992) and Finus (2001) find that a stable IEA consists of three countries when the climate damage is linear and of two countries when the climate damage is quadratic.
These papers assume that both signatories and non-signatories behave in a Cournot-Nash fashion.
Another strand of the IEA literature which we will follow in the present paper makes use of the Stackelberg assumption portraying the climate coalition 1 as Stackelberg leader and all non-cooperative countries as Stackelberg followers. In that framework Barrett's (1994) simulation results suggest the existence of stable coalition sizes between two and the grand coalition. However, Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006) proved that large stable IEAs imply zero emissions (corner solutions) or negative emissions. The latter must clearly be ruled out in models without stock pollution, because it is infeasible to abate more emissions than are generated. As Rubio and Ulph point out, the reason for negative emissions is the assumption of non-essential emissions which is standard in the literature on IEAs. Although that assumption is unrealistic in the case of carbon emissions and climate change, we will stick to it for reasons of tractability and comparability with pertaining literature and we will follow Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) in restricting parameter values such that the resultant emissions are always strictly positive. Under that constraint (along with the assumption of non-essential emissions) Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) as well as Rubio and Ulph (2006) find that the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs is not larger than four.
The basic model of an IEA employed by Barrett (1994) , Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006) and others is a static model of symmetric countries where each country's domestic emissions generate domestic welfare that is decreasing at the margin and where all countries' emissions create a welfare loss (climate damage) which is uniform across countries and increasing at the margin.
2 That model does not account for production, consumption, markets and international trade and thus captures the world economy in a rudimentary way only. It has been extended in various directions (Finus 2003) .
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For example, Hoel and Schneider (1997) introduce transfer schemes in the coalition formation process, Kolstad (2007) The present paper aims to extend the basic model along these lines and then investigates the impact of that extension on the stability of IEAs in the Stackelberg leader-follower framework. We will add structure to the national economies by introducing a consumer good and fossil fuel that are produced in each country, consumed by its representative consumer and traded on world markets. 5 In this general equilibrium framework we first briefly characterize the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario with non-cooperative governments as a benchmarkt and then turn to our central theme, the characterization of self-enforcing IEAs in the Stackelberg model.
For the case of positive equilibrium emissions we find that -depending on parameter constellations -international trade may significantly increase the size of stable IEAs. That is, the conditions for successful sub-global cooperative action appear to be more favorable than suggested by the basic model of the IEA literature. Unfortunately, the hope for a more 2 Barrett (1994) models abatement, and therefore his approach seems to differ from the basic model, at first glance. However, as pointed out by Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006, Section 4 ), Barrett's model is equivalent to the basic model as long as abatement does not exceed the flow of emissions.
3 Modifying and extending, respectively, the basic model, Barrett (1999) and Hannesson (2010) show that stable coalitions may consist of a large number of countries, if the coalition behaves as a Nash player. 4 There are also studies relaxing the assumption of the basic model that countries are identical (e.g.
Barrett 2001
). In the present paper we will stick to that assumption to keep our model tractable.
5 Despite the importance of international trade for the formation of IEAs, to our knowledge there is only one paper dealing with that issue, and that is Barrett (1997) The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and briefly analyzes the business-as-usual scenario which serves as a benchmark throughout the paper. 
The model
The world economy consists of n identical countries. Each country produces two consumer goods. The first is a standard composite good, called good X (quantity x i ) and the second is a fossil energy carrier (quantity e i ), e.g. oil, gas or coal extracted from domestic fossil reserves. We refer to that good simply as fuel. 6 Each country's production technology is 6 Households do not consume fuel directly but use fuel as input in a linear household production function to produce e.g. the commodities heat or transportation services. To keep the exposition simple, we refrain from modeling the household production technology, however, and interpret fuel as consumer good.
represented by the production possibility frontier
where the function T is decreasing and strictly concave in e s i . The transformation function (1) implies that both commodities are produced by means of domestic productive factors (e.g. labor and capital) whose endowments are given. The utility
of the representative consumer of country i is additive separable in all arguments and linear in the consumption x d i of good X. V is increasing and concave, and D is increasing and convex in its argument. The consumption of fuel generates the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide whose emission is proportional to fuel consumption. Emission units are chosen such that e d i denotes both fuel demanded by consumer i and carbon emissions from burning fuel. There is no abatement technology for emission reduction.
9 The function D captures the climate damage caused by worldwide carbon emissions from burning fuel.
For the sake of more specific results, throughout the paper we will specify the functions T , V and D from (1) and (2) by the following quadratic functional forms:
wherex, a, b and α are positive parameters.
In our stylized model (1) and (2) of the individual country's economy all fuel goes from production directly to consumers where 'fuel production' can be interpreted to include extraction of fossil energy carriers as well as production of electricity, gasoline, gas or coal for non-business usage. Carbon capture and sequestration is a potential abatement technology which is unlikely to be applied on a large scale in the near or medium term future. 10 In (3) the parametric form of T (e s i ) can be 'microfounded' as follows. Letr be country i's endowment of a (composite) production factor and consider the production functions x = α x r x and e = (r e /α e ) 1/2 with r e + r x =r. α e , α x are positive constants. The quadratic transformation function in (3) is straightforward from these three equations when settingx := α xr and α := α x α e . 11 Such simplifications are driven by limits of tractability. We also wish to recall, however, that the model of the present paper is far more complex than the basic model of IEA (e.g. Finus 2003 , Section 2.3) which does without specifying production, consumption and markets, as we have pointed out in the introduction.
EU emission trading scheme, we maintain that our simplification still captures the central issue of emission regulation. Whether fuel consumption of industries or of consumers is regulated, in both cases more stringent emission caps require raising the domestic price for fuel consumption which, in turn, induces allocative displacement effects via changes in relative prices.
There are perfectly competitive world markets for good X (price p x ≡ 1) and for fuel (producer price p), and the markets are in equilibrium if
The firms' supply of fuel is straightforward. Taking prices as given, the (aggregate) producer i maximizes profits x s i + pe s i subject to (1) which yields the first-order condition
Combined with (1), equation (5) implies a fuel supply function
Each government i regulates domestic carbon emissions by enforcing an emission cap e i . For the time being we suppose these caps are arbitrarily fixed and tight enough to be binding.
To implement its emission cap, government i issues the amount e i of emission permits and auctions them at the permit price π i . Consumers in country i need to acquire emission permits to match their purchase of fuel. The representative consumer i ignores the impact of her emissions on climate damage and maximizes her (consumption) utility V (e
subject to her budget constraint
is consumer i's income (= profit income plus recycled revenues from the permit auction).
From the first-order condition p
follows a fuel demand function
The result of auctioning the permits obviously is
Combining the equilibrium condition j e s j = j e d j from (4) with (6) and (9) yields
Equation (10) determines the unique equilibrium price of fuel and also establishes that in equilibrium all firms produce the same amount of fuel, j e j /n. From (5), (8) and (9) follows
+ π i . This equation determines the unique equilibrium permit price.
The equilibrium supplies and demands on the market for good X are
where the first equation in (11) is implied by (1) and (10) and the second by (1), (7), (9) and (10). It readily follows from (11) that the market for good X is in equilibrium, if the fuel market is in equilibrium.
To sum up, in the world economy with non-cooperative emission cap regulation there is a unique competitive equilibrium for every profile (e 1 , . . . , e n ) of binding emission caps. That is, in equilibrium all demands and supplies, and all prices are determined by (e 1 , . . . , e n ).
Combining welfare (2) with (9), (10) and (11) results in the equilibrium welfare of country
So far we have considered governments that fix national emission caps in an arbitrary way. From now on their objective function is supposed to be national welfare, (12). Before addressing cooperation in emission regulation, we briefly investigate the benchmark case of global non-cooperation. In game-theoretic language, the n governments are the players of a non-cooperative game. Their strategies are national emission caps and their payoff functions are national welfares, (12). The natural solution concept is the Nash equilibrium, a state, where each government's emission cap is the best response to each other government's emission cap. We refer to that equilibrium as business as usual (BAU). In terms of the formal model, government i chooses that cap e i which maximizes W i (e 1 , . . . , e n ) for given caps (e 1 , . . . , e i−1 , e i+1 , . . . , e n ). Differentiation of (12) with respect to e i yields the first-order
Eichner and Pethig (2012) show that W i e i = 0 can be converted into a best reply functionR satisfying
whose first derivative is in the interval ] − 1, 0[ under mild restrictions. Hence there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium satisfying e i = e j for all j = i. If the functions 12 Throughout the paper we restrict our attention to interior solutions.
V , T and D are specified as in (3) 
Climate coalition as Stackelberg leader
Suppose now that some countries are members in a climate coalition, whereas all other countries continue to act non-cooperatively. For the sake of formal analysis, we lump together the first m countries, 2 ≤ m < n, in one group, denoted group C := {1, 2, . . . , m} with C for coalition, and collect all remaining countries in another group, denoted group F := {m + 1, . . . , n} with F for fringe. Our focus will be on a game of sequential choice of emission caps in which the coalition is the Stackelberg leader and moves first and the fringe countries are Stackelberg followers. The coalition formation literature has made ample use of the Stackelberg assumption (Finus 2001 ) and we refer the reader to that literature for information on the discussion about the plausibility and relative merits of the Nash concept on the one hand and the Stackelberg concept on the other. 13 Our aim is to investigate how the Stackelberg assumption drives the outcome of the game when we extend the basic model as outlined in Section 2.
Climate coalitions and coalition sizes
Stackelberg equilibrium In the present section we aim to characterize the allocation in the Stackelberg equilibrium (to be specified below) for alternatively given coalition sizes and thus prepare for the analysis of coalition stability in the next Section 3.2. The objective of the climate coalition C is to maximize the joint welfare j∈C W j (e 1 , . . . , e n ) of its members taking the behavior of the fringe countries into account. Since all coalition countries are alike, e i = e j for all i, j ∈ C is a necessary maximum condition which allows us to set e i = e c for all i ∈ C. Thus the coalition can be treated as a single player whose strategy will be denoted 13 Eichner and Pethig (2012) is a companion paper in which the climate coalition is modeled as a Nash player.
as s c := me c . We continue portraying fringe countries as non-cooperative Nash players, and therefore W i e i = 0 still applies for each fringe country. As W i e i = 0 cannot be satisfied for i, j ∈ F, i = j, unless e i = e j , we proceed by setting e i = e f for all i ∈ F . With this notation, each fringe country's best-reply function (13) reads e f =R[s c + (n − m − 1)e f ]. Eichner and Pethig (2012) show that this equation implies a function R satisfying (n−m)e f = R(me c , m)
where s c := me c and s f := (n − m)e f .
According to (14) fringe countries can be treated as if they act as a single player whose strategy is s f . In that sense R is the 'aggregate' best reply function of 'the fringe'. However, it is important to emphasize that R is a purely formal transformation ofR from (13), and therefore (14) does not imply any cooperation among fringe countries. R turns out to be an important analytical tool.
With the newly introduced notation s f := (n − m)e f , we next express total emissions as e j = s c + s f and rewrite the welfare of individual countries, (12), as
for all countries in group C and as
for all countries in group F . For convenience of notation and later reference we refer to 
The Stackelberg equilibrium
] is a point in the strategy space at which the best-reply function R of the fringe and an iso-welfare curve of the coalition are tangent.
In the sequel we will characterize the solution of (17), its relation to the BAU equilibrium and its dependence on the (exogenous) size of the coalition. We proceed in several steps beginning with the implications of an arbitrary action s c ∈ [0, mT −1 (0)] of the leader.
The coalition's anticipation of the fringe's reactions as driving force of outcomes
The best-reply function of the fringe, (14), is of special interest, because all feasible outcomes necessarily satisfy that function. Accounting for R the coalition knows that its own emissions and those of the fringe are strategic substitutes. So it takes into consideration that if it reduces its emissions by the amount ∆s c < 0 [increases its emissions by the amount ∆s c > 0] total emissions will shrink [expand] , but by less than ∆s c . 14 In the climate change literature this phenomenon is referred to as carbon leakage for the case ∆s c < 0.
The leakage rate is usually expressed by R sc ∈ ]0, 1[. Since R scm > 0 (Appendix A), the leakage rate is declining in the coalition size -which conforms to intuition and will turn out to drive the results. One can also show that
If e c is kept constant, total emissions are rising in m, because the fringe's responding emission reduction falls short of the coalition's emission increase. Moreover, if m is kept constant, total emissions are rising in e c because the leakage rate is positive but less than one. 16 Finally we note that the increase in total emissions resulting from a given increase in the coalition countries' emissions is the larger, the larger is the coalition size. 17 That is, large coalitions are more effective in curbing total emissions, because the leakage rate is declining in the coalition size.
Coalition size, equilibrium emissions and welfares, and their relation to BAU According to our previous analysis the entire Stackelberg equilibrium allocation is uniquely determined by -and varies with -the coalition size. To formalize that observation it is
·de c . Here we treat m as a real number in [1, n] for analytical convenience although we will keep in mind that in real-world coalitions m is an integer in the set {1, . . . , n}.
17 Formally this follows from
analytically convenient to introduce the notation
and to consider the interval [0, n] to be the domain of all these functions. A first but important result is the following proposition proved in Appendix C.
Proposition 1 .
The Stackelberg equilibrium with the coalition of sizem ∈ [1, n]
coincides with the non-cooperative BAU equilibrium, if and only if
Proposition 1 specifies the link between Stackelberg equilibria and the BAU equilibrium.
For the coalition it is optimal to choose the BAU emissions e * 
For the interpretation of (20) we invoke our result from the Appendix C that the coalition's marginal consumption welfare in BAU is independent of the coalition size, so that variations in total marginal welfare result from variations in the coalition's marginal climate welfare exclusively. Hence, total BAU emissions ne o are considered suboptimally large by large coalitions (m >m) and suboptimally small by small coalitions (m <m). 19 We combine the information of (14) and (20) with the properties of W c [me c , R(me c , m), m] specified in Appendix B to conclude:
The rationale of (21) is straightforward in view of footnote 17. In case of m <m the leakage rate is high so that the coalition achieves a small reduction in total emissions only, if it reduces e c . That makes total emission reductions very expensive. If, instead, the coalition relaxes rather than tightens the emission cap e c , the resulting increase in total emissions is small owing to the high leakage rate, but the gain in consumption welfare is relatively large.
Mirror symmetric arguments apply to the case m >m. Since leakage rates are always less than unity,
follows from (21). According to (22) 
with
. In case of m <m the coalition finds it beneficial to expand own emissions above BAU level which induces the fringe countries to tighten their emission caps. The opportunity costs of that policy on the part of fringe countries is consumption foregone. The consumption welfare loss combined with the reduction in climate welfare pushes the fringe countries' total welfare below BAU level. Thus, the coalition free rides on the fringe countries' mitigation efforts. In case of m >m the roles of both groups are reversed. Now the fringe countries free ride on the coalition's mitigation policy, which is their expected role, and the fringe countries benefit on two margins: Their consumption welfare rises compared to BAU as well as their climate welfare. A general principle appears to be that countries with laxer emission regulation have higher welfare levels. So far, we summarize our results in Proposition 2 . Consider the transition from BAU to the Stackelberg equilibrium.
The shift of 20 In our numerical calculations W c will turn out to be u-shaped as shown in Figure 2 below.
(i) the coalition country's emissions is characterized in (21);
(ii) total emissions is characterized in (22); (iii) the coalition country's and fringe country's welfare is characterized in (23).
The results of Proposition 2 provide interesting information about the relations between the coalition size, the BAU equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. However, as the functions E j and W j for j = c, f depend on m in a very complex way, their curvature cannot be specified analytically.
Numerical example To make progress we resort to a numerical example, referred to as According to the left panel of Figure 2 , the (total) welfare of coalition countries is u-shaped with its unique minimum at m =m, whereas W f is strictly increasing in m. The surprising feature of the right panel of Figure 2 is not that the world welfare rises in m but that for all m <m the world welfare falls short of its BAU level. The coalition of size m <m 21 We cannot generalize our findings from Example 1 by induction, of course. Yet we have run several other examples, e.g. the Example 2 specified by the parameter values a = 1000, b = 2000,x = 12, α = 500000, and n = 100 (to be considered in the next section). The graphs corresponding to all examples under scrutiny turned out to be qualitatively the same as those in the Figures 1, 2 and 3 which is why we restrict the graphical presentation to Example 1. 22 We consider as negligible that the functions E f , W f , mW c + (n − m)W f and mE c + (n − m)E f are slightly non-monotone for m < 2. clearly succeeds in raising its welfare above BAU level by increasing the climate damage at the expense of the fringe countries. As the latter engage in costly mitigation to keep the increase in total emissions small, they suffer a welfare loss compared to BAU (left panel of Figure 2 ) which is even larger than the coalition's welfare gain. to the high leakage rate in case of m <m, the coalition finds it advantageous to sacrifice, compared to BAU, some climate welfare for additional consumption welfare. Conversely, if m >m, the coalition is more effective in reducing total emissions and therefore benefits from shifting away from consumption welfare toward higher climate welfare.
Self-enforcing IEAs
In the preceding Section 3.1 we have presupposed the presence of a climate coalition, and our focus has been on characterizing the Stackelberg equilibrium and its dependence on the exogenous coalition size m. Now we turn to the issue of coalition stability. Since supranational authorities for the effective enforcement of agreements are not available, IEAs will not prevail unless they are self-enforcing in the sense that no signatory has an incentive to defect (internal stability) and no non-signatory has an incentive to sign the agreement (external stability). 23 In formal language, an IEA with m ∈ {1, . . . , n} signatories is said to be self-enforcing or stable if it satisfies the internal stability condition
and the external stability condition
With the distinction between the membership m ∈ {1, . . . , n} of real-world IEAs and the real-number approximation m ∈ [1, n] in mind we find that if a self-enforcing IEA with (25) for the numerical Examples 1 and 2 introduced in the previous Section 3.1. the climate damage is only slightly lower and the coalition countries' welfare is only slightly higher than in BAU, while the welfare gain of fringe countries is greater than that of coalition countries.
As we found that m * is very close tom in all of our examples we assess the determinants of the size of m * by investigating the determinants ofm. Recall that according to (19),m depends on the size of the parameters α, b and n. To examine howm varies with α, we differentiate (19) with respect to α and obtain
24 It is straightforward from the left panels of the Figures 4 and 5 that the equilibrium emissions E f (m * )
and E c (m * ) are strictly positive.
For α converging to infinity we find lim α→∞m = (19) allows for high levels ofm, even form = n (grand coalition). However, the non-negativity constraint for emissions turns out to be violated for low values of α (and b < n/(n − 1)). We did not find any numerical example of Stackelberg equilibria exhibiting both non-negative emissions and stable coalition sizes larger than
. Hence under the condition of positive equilibrium emissions the maximum share of countries in a stable coalition, 100 m * /n, appears to be slightly higher than 50%. We need to emphasize, however, that there are various examples in the Tables 1 and 2 in which the share 100 m * /n is much smaller than 50%. It is also worth noting that in all cases but one calculated in the Tables 1 and 2 m * is the smallest or second smallest integer larger thanm.
The role the parameter α plays in the formation of self-enforcing IEAs calls for an economic interpretation. To keep focussed we restrict our attention to the set of parameters satisfying b > n/(n − 1) and define the fuel extraction costs, expressed in units of good X,
Those extraction costs are obviously progressively increasing such that increasing α corresponds to increasing marginal extraction costs which increases the size of stable coalitions in turn. The lower and the less progressive the extraction costs, the smaller is the size of the stable coalition. We summarize our results in Proposition 3 .
Under the conditon of positive equilibrium emissions there exist selfenforcing IEAs that are characterized as follows:
(i) If b > n/(n − 1), then the stable coalition size m * increases in the parameter α such that as many as (slightly more than) 50% of all countries may be members of a stable coalition.
(ii) The number of countries in the self-enforcing IEAs is the smallest or the second smallest integer m * larger thanm from (19). Therefore the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium allocation differs only slightly from the allocation in the scenario of global noncooperation (BAU).
We are aware of the limited scope of Proposition 3 because it is based on numerical examples. Nonetheless, the unequivocal result of the calculations we conducted suggests that the messages of Proposition 3 are more general. Proposition 3(i) gives support to the expectation that international trade may lead to rather large stable coalitions. That appears to be good news for supporters of strong climate damage mitigation action, if large stable coalitions promise to bring about reductions of global emissions that are larger by an order of magnitude than in BAU and hopefully not too far away from the socially optimal allocation. Unfortunately, Proposition 3(ii) shatters that expectation. Our numerical calculations rather suggest that stable coalitions reduce world emissions only insignificantly compared to BAU emissions. To the extent that this result is general -which we are not able to prove analytically -the highly inconvenient implication is that efforts to reach a self-enforcing IEA do not pay.
Proposition 3(ii) calls for explanation and economic intuition. It is clear from the conditions (24) and (25) that the stability of coalitions depends on the properties of the functions W c and W f . In the left panel of Figure 2 we see that W f (m)−W c (m), the vertical difference between the welfare curves W f and W c , is zero for m =m and positive for all m >m. That difference can be interpreted as the free-rider advantage of fringe countries over coalition countries. In our Example 1 that free-rider advantage grows with the coalition size suggesting that the incentive to leave the coalition increases and the incentive to join declines with the coalition size. However, the defining criterion for coalition stability is the horizontal rather than the vertical distance between the welfare curves W f and W c . To be more specific, we introduce the function
H(m) measures the horizontal distance between the welfare curves W f and W c at the level W c (m) above the horizontal m-axis. Unfortunately, analytical complexity prevents us from determining the curvature of H in our parametric model. Figure 6 shows for Example 1 that the function H is strictly increasing in m on the relevant part of its domain. 25 As we found that kind of curvature of H in all of our examples, it appears to be robust. Our preceding arguments aimed at identifying the driving forces of coalition stability.
For further interpretation we define the functions
where the parameters ω o , ω 1 , ω 2 and ω 3 are assumed to satisfy (i) There exists a stable coalition of size m * >m and m * is unique, in general.
28
(ii) Ceteris paribus, the difference m * −m is the smaller, -the slower the coalition countries' welfare increases with the coalition size (ω 1 ↓) due to tight domestic emission caps and leakage-retarded climate damage reduction;
-the faster the fringe countries' welfare increases with the coalition size (ω 2 ↑ and ω 3 ↑) due to lax domestic emission caps (reflecting carbon leakage) and free rides on climate damage reduction.
(iii) The size of the stable coalition is either the smallest or the second smallest integer weakly larger thanm, if and only if 3ω 1 < 2ω 2 + ω 3 .
Proposition 4(i) confirms for the 'auxiliary' functions Ω c and Ω f our findings reported in the context of Figure 6 . Proposition 4(ii) identifies the parameters ω 1 , ω 2 and ω 3 as determinants of the size of the difference m * −m and links these parameters to their economic impacts in a straightforward way. Proposition 4(iii) clarifies that the stable coalition size m * will be the smallest or second smallest integer larger thanm, if and only if the relative difference between the welfare increases in the coalition size of fringe and coalition countries is sufficiently large.
Here the change in the vertical distance between the functions Ω f and Ω c determines the size of the difference m * −m because in case of positive parameters ω 1 , ω 2 and ω 3 the vertical as well as the horizontal difference is increasing in m.
On the role of international trade
Up to now we have dealt with a world economy characterized by the four parameters 
which simply turns the world markets for good X and fossil fuel into domestic markets.
Good X can still be taken as numéraire (p xi = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n) but (5) is now replaced 28 We show in the proof (Appendix E) that in exceptional cases there are two stable coalitions.
by p ei = −T ′ (e i ) for i = 1, . . . , n. With these changes the welfare of country i is
for the general functions (1) and (2) and
withb := b + α for the parametric functions (3).
The comparison of (12) and (30) 
for which the Stackelberg equilibrium (in case of real-number coalitions) is equal to the BAU equilibrium in the economy (a, α, b, n). The comparison of (32) with (26) readily yieldsm a <m.
Since in the regime of autarky the model of the present paper coincides with the basic model of the coalition formation literature, we can invoke the results of Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006) . They show that ". . . restricting parameter values to guarantees interior solutions is a sufficient condition to get stable IEAs with a small number of signatories . . ." (Rubio and Ulph, 2006, p. 236 29 See e.g. Finus (2001, equation (3.1) ). Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006, equation (1)) as well as Rubio and Ulph (2006, equation (1)) restrict their analysis to the parametric version (31) of the basic model. 30 In the sequel the autarky regime is indicated by the super-or subscript a.
interior solutions they find that the maximum stable coalition size is three.
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To sum up, as long as solutions with non-positive emissions are ruled out, we get stable
IEAs with a small number of signatories in the autarky scenario (= basic model) irrespective of the total number of countries. That result clearly is in stark contrast to our finding in the free-trade model of Section 3 where we have identified stable coalitions much larger than in the autarky model.
Regarding the comparison of free trade and autarky, we also want to know how effective the stable coalition is in reducing world emissions below BAU emissions. Rubio and Ulph (2006) focus on a parameter space that secures positive equilibrium emissions (ibidem, footnote 16) and point out that m * a ≤ 3 (ibidem Corollary 2). However, they do not address the size of the difference m * a −m a . Diamontoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) find that the welfare of the signatories is very close to its lowest value when the IEA is stable but they do not link that observation to the BAU scenario. Analogous to the result m * >m in Section 3.2, it is straightforward to establish that in autarky the size of a self-enforcing IEA satisfies m * a >m a . Moreover, the Appendix G proves that m * a −m a ≤ 2 for all economies in the parameter space considered in Rubio and Ulph (2006) . We summarize these findings in Proposition 5 .
Consider the world economy without international trade for a parameter space introduced by Rubio and Ulph (2006) that secures positive equilibrium emissions.
(i) Then our model coincides with the 'basic model' studied e.g. by Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006) .
(ii) Then the size m * a of self-enforcing IEAs is the smallest or second smallest integer larger thanm a from (32), and at most equal to 3.
(iii) The emission caps of the signatories of the self-enforcing IEA are only slightly tighter than the emission cap in the BAU equilibrium.
The remainder of Section 4 serves to explain the differences in outcome between the scenarios of autarky and free trade. Since in both cases the stable Stackelberg equilibrium is close to BAU, the reasons for "m * a −m a > 0 but small" are the same in qualitative terms as those for "m * −m > 0 but small" discussed in Section 3.2. Hence we can restrict our focus on explanations form >m a .
31 Barrett (1994) shows that there are parameter constellations for which the self-enforcing IEA may attain any size from very small to the grand coalition. That finding is not at variance with our results because Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) convert Barrett's approach into the basic model of type (31) and show that in Barrett's framework self-enforcing IEAs consist of no more than four countries on the set of parameters leading to positive equilibrium emissions.
One way to highlight the reason form >m a is to invoke the fuel extraction costs and it is true that, if it exists, the size of the stable coalition in autarky, m * a , is larger thañ m a . We prove in the Appendix F that R sc > R a sc . That important quantitative difference between both regimes means that the leakage rate is larger in the free-trade regime than in autarky.
32 As an immediate consequence of (31) To further characterize the differences between autarky and free trade we consider trade and autarky and the dependence of these differences on the coalition size.
Recall that welfare consists of consumption welfare and climate welfare and that large coalitions are more effective in reducing total emissions. The right panel of Figure 7 il-32 Emissions of fringe and coalition are strategic substitutes under both free trade and autarky. But they are stronger strategic substitutes with trade than without. Copeland and Taylor (2005) reach the opposite conclusion in a model that differs substantially from ours -and even find conditions under which emissions of different countries turn into strategic complements when the borders are opened. lustrates that with international trade the coalition countries enjoy much higher levels of consumption welfare than in autarky. For coalition sizes m <m the coalition finds it beneficial to increase climate damage compared to BAU in order to raise consumption welfare through importing fossil fuel and exporting consumer goods. With closed borders these increases in consumption welfare are not attainable which makes climate damage reduction more attractive in autarky than under free trade. In autarky all countries necessarily consume what they produce whereas under free trade the coalition countries take advantage of decoupling consumption from production and thus raise their consumption welfare. Recall also that leakage rates under autarky are smaller than under free trade. Both effects imply that coalitions of given size set tighter emission caps (implying higher climate welfare as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 8 ) under autarky than under free trade, as can be seen in the left panel of Figure 7 . Consequently, the size of the coalition choosing the BAU emission cap is larger under free trade than under autarky (m a <m).
The left panel of Figure 7 shows that in both regimes the emissions of coalition countries are falling, that they are lower in autarky than in the trade regime, and that this difference tends to zero with m approaching n. The positive difference E c (m) − E ca (m) is clearly due to R sc > R a sc and the absence or presence of international trade. Taking the BAU consumption [T (e o ), e o ] and the corresponding consumption welfare, K o , as a benchmark, the right panel of Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between the levels of consumption welfare of coalition countries in BAU, K o , in autarky, K a (m), and under free trade, K(m).
K(m) is larger than K a (m), because the fuel consumption E c (m) is larger than E ca (m) and because the coalition countries benefit from decoupling consumption and production. Due to the more stringent emission reduction in autarky, the climate welfare of all countries is higher in autarky than in free trade -as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 8 .
As the coalition countries' consumption welfare is lower and their climate welfare is higher in autarky than in free trade, their net welfare change is ambiguous. More specific information on the comparison of total welfare W ca (m) and W c (m) provides the right panel
of Figure 8 . It shows that when moving from autarky to free trade, the coalition countries'
climate welfare gain is overcompensated by their consumption welfare loss and the opposite holds for relatively large coalition sizes m >m.
Concluding remarks
The present paper reexamines the issue of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) extending the basic model of the IEA literature introduced by Barrett (1994) and others to a general equilibrium framework with production, consumption and interna- An interesting side result is that in the absence of international trade our model coincides with the basic model of the extant IEA literature, which means, in turn, that the basic model can be interpreted as a model of autarkic countries. We know from the literature that in the basic model the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs is very small, and we add the result that the allocation in the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium does not differ much from the business-as-usual allocation. As in the case of international trade, the coalition countries' welfare rises and the climate damage declines by a very small amount only.
Although our model has more 'economic' structure than the basic model we have kept it simple enough for the benefit of comparing it with the basic model and for the benefit of deriving informative results. As pointed out in the introduction the assumption of emissions being non-essential is not fully satisfactory for carbon emissions in the context of climate change mitigation. It is necessary and desirable to examine the outcome for the case of essential emissions, even if analytical results cannot be obtained anymore. More generally, one would want to check the robustness of results when economies are modeled in a more complex way, e.g. when fossil fuel is not only a final consumption good but also an intermediary industrial input. It is needless to say that while the assumption of symmetric countries is crucial for deriving meaningful (analytical) results, it abstracts from many realworld complexities which are severe barriers to reaching self-enforcing IEAs, and it therefore likely underestimates the difficulties of forming such agreements.
